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INTERFERENCE WITH OIL AND GAS RIGHTS - MEASURE OF DAM-
AGES.-The problem of determining the proper measure of the plain-
tiff's recovery in an action.for the wrongful taking of property, in
the cases where the wrongdoer has expended money or labor which
has rendered the property more valuable, has always perplexed the
courts, and has been solved in various ways. The desire of the
courts, on the one hand to preserve the sanctity of property rights,
and, on the other hand, not to mulct the wrongdoer in an amount
which would shock the conscience has led *to conclusions which
cannot be reconciled on principle. In jurisdictions where a re-
covery of chattels in specie is still permitted by a procedure ana-
logous to replevin or detinue, and in all jurisdictions, by a peaceable
recaption,' the owner may usually recover his property, even
though it has been improved by the defendant.2 But if the wrong-
doer was acting under an honest mistake,3 or even negligently,'
' Isle Royale Mining Co. v. Hertin, 37 Mich. 332, 26 Am. Rep. 520 (1877).2 Eaton v. Langley, 65 Ark. 448, 47 S. W. 123, 42 L. R. A. 474 (1898).
W etherbee v. Green, 22 Mich. 319, 7 Am. Rep. 653 (1871) ; Lewis v. Court-
wright, 77 Iowa 190, 41 N. W. 615 (1889) ; Baker v. Meisch, 29 Neb. 227, 45 N. W.
685 (1890); Werner Stave Co. v. Pickering, 55 Tex. Civ. App. 632, 119 S. W.
333 (1909).
' Trustees of Dartmouth College v. International Paper Co., 132 Fed. 92 (1904).
semble, and cases cited therein.
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and the increase in the value was such that the original value of
the property taken was insignificant in comparison with the value
of the property in its improved condition, many courts have held
that the title has passed, and the former owner is relegated to an
action for damages for the wrongful taking. If, however, the
wrongful taking was conscious and wilful, no such doctrine has
been usually applied, even though the value has been greatly in-
creased,5 or the property has undergone a change in specie.'
If no recovery in specie can be had, as in those jurisdictions
where the defendant in replevin is permitted to permanently re-
tain the property upon giving bond, or in case the property
or its product is no longer available, or the former owner seeks no
specific recovery, but sues in trespass or trover, the difficult ques-
tion of properly measuring the plaintiff's damages is presented.
Where the taking was innocent, in the sense that it was not con-
sciously and wilfully wrongful, the courts have laid down a
variety of rules, running from the value of the property in place,
before it was disturbed by the wrongful taking 7 to the value at
the time of action brought, less the expense of improvement,8 and
including almost every conceivable rule between those extremes.'
Where, however, the taking was conscious and wilful, the courts
have, in nearly all the cases permitted a recovery which goes
beyond the rule of the value at the time of taking, and have re-
quired the wrongdoer to pay the former owner not only the
original value of the property taken, but the added value created
by the defendant. 10 This view seems entirely illogical, since it
both gives the former owner more than he has lost, and takes from
the wrongdoer more than he has gained. It is, in effect, a punish-
ment inflicted upon the wrongdoer, and some courts have frankly
so recognized it," but other courts have attempted to reconcile
Baker v. Wheeler, 8 Wend. 505, 24 Am. Dec. 66 (N. Y. 1832) ; Powers v. Tilley,
S7 Me. 34, 32 At. 714. 47 Am. St. Rep. 304 (1894) ; Wing v. Milliken. 91 Me. 387,
40 Atl. 138, 64 Am. St. Rep. 238 (1898).
. Silsbury v. McCoon, 3 N. Y. 379, 53 Am. Dec. 307 (1850) ; Curtis v. Groat, 6John. 169, 5 Am. Dec. 204 (N. Y. 1810); 2 KnNT, COmiENTARES, *363, but cf.
364.
M artin v. Porter, 5 M. & W. 351 (1839) Morgan v. Powell, 3 Q. B. 278 (1842)
'Wood v. Morewood, 3 Q. B. 440 (1841) ; Hilton v. Woods, L. R. 4 Eq. 432 (1867)Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co., L. R. 5 App. Cas. 25 (1880) ; United States v.
Homestake Co., 117 Fed. 481, 54 C. C. A. 303 (1903) ; King v,. Merriman, 38 Minn.
47, 35 N. W. 570 (18S7).
Jegon v. Vivian, L. R. 6 Ch. 742 (1871) ; Powers v. United States, 119 Fed. 562,
56 C. C. A. 128 (1903).
1 See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. International Paper Co., supra, note 4,
where the various rules are collected.
" Ellis v. Wire, 33 Ind. 127, 5 Am. Rep. 189 (1870), and cases therein cited;
Barton Coal Co. v. Cox, 39 Md. 1, 17 Am. Rep. 525 (1873); Cheeney V. Nebraska
etc. Stone Co., 41 Fed. 740 (1890).
11 Railway Co. v. Hutchins, 32 Ohio St. 571. 30 Am. Rep. 629 (1877) ; State v.Shevlin Co.. 66 Minn. 217, 68 N. W. 973 (1895) ; Beede v. Lamprey, 64 N. H. 510,15 Atl. 133, 10 Am. St. Rep. 426 (1888).
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this measure of recovery with the general doctrine of compensatory
damages. 2 A minority of courts have, however, refused to apply
a different rule to the wilful trespasser and have limited the former
owner to the value of his property at the time and place of the
original taking.1
3
In the state of West Virginia there is, it is believed, no reported
direct adjudication in an action at law upon the questions discuss-
ed above, in spite of the fact that the production of coal, oil, gas and
timber would be expected to give rise to litigation involving these
questions. There have been, however, cases involving an account-
ing in equity for the wrongful taking of such property, in which
the courts have applied analogous principles. Of these, the recent
case of Pittsburgh & West Virginia Gas Co. v. Pentres! Gas Co., 1
is of importance as indicating the attitude which the courts of
West Virginia will probably take toward the questions discussed
above, when they are squarely presented. In the case under con-
sideration" the facts were that A, the owner of land, executed a
C"no-term" oil and gas "lease" to B upon said land. Subsequently
A, believing that the "lease" to B had become void, executed a
similar lease to C. Both B and C attempted to drill upon the
land, when A and C secured a perpetual injuncton in the circuit
court, against B's drilling upon the land While this injunction
was in force C drilled a well upon the land, at a cost of five
thousand dollars, and produced oil from the well, expending fif-
teen hundred dollars in caring for, storing and transporting the oil,
which oil was sold by C for slightly less than fifteen hundred
dollars. B prosecuted an appeal from the injunction suit, and
in the Supreme Court of Appeals the judgment of the circuit court
was reversed and C's bill dismissed. Thereupon B brought suit
against C for an injunction against further operations upon the
land in question, and to have an accounting and recovery of
the money received by C for the oil taken from the premises. The
trial court declined to allow C the cost of drilling the well, but
did allow the cost of caring for, transporting and storing the oil,
which was sufficient to offset the amount received for the oil.
Upon appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals it was held that C
was not entitled to any deduction whatever on account of the
expense of producing and marketing the oil, but was liable to B
' Trustees of Dartmouth College v. International Paper Co., supra, note 4.
23 Single v. Schneider, 30 Wis. 570 (1872) ; Weymouth v. Railroad, 17 Wis. 550.
84 Am. Dec. 763; Hungerford v. Redford, 29 Wis. 345 (1872).
' 84 W. Va. 449, 100 S. E. 296 (1919).
15 Pittsburgh & West Virginia Gas Co. v. Pentress Gas Co., supra, note 14.
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for the total amount of the money received from the sale of the oil.
The court, in the course of the opinion adopted the rule "that
where the trespass is willful, the measure of damages is the value
of the property at the time and place of demand, without deduc-
tion for labor and expense, but where such trespass is not willful,
but is the result of a mistake of fact, the measure of plaintiff's
damages is the value of the article after its severance, less the
proper expense of such severance." It is apparent from the
discussion above that the rule adopted is the harshest of all the
rules applied by the courts of other jurisdictions, as to both wilful
and innocent wrongdoers and that the insertion of the words "of
fact" in the rule make it harsher and more rigorous than any rule
applied by any court heretofore, except a single decision by the
Supreme Court of the United States." All the decisions except
these have applied the rigorous rule of recovery only to a de-
fendant who acted consciously and wilfully and with knowledge
that he was taking the property of another.1 7 It is not apparent
why this test of "innocence" is not as fully met by one who acted
upon a mistake of law, as upon a mistake of fact. Since the harsh
rule of damages is applied as a punishment to the wrongdoer giving
the former owner more than he has lost and taking from the wrong-
doer more than he has gained, it should be applied only against
one who deserves to be punished, because he has consciously taken
what belongs to another. So are the authorities.' 8  If a negligent
mistake of fact does not lay one open to the punishment, an honest
and non-negligent mistake as to one's legal rights, which mistake
in the case under discussion"9 was joined in by the circuit court
after a full hearing on the facts and the law, 0 should not do so.
One who makes such a mistake is no dangerous character, wantonly
appropriating the property of his neighbors, and needing the les-
son of a punitive judgment.
If we should eliminate the words "of fact" from the rule laid
down by the court in the Pentress Case, then there would, as ap-
pears from the above discussion, be abundant precedent for the
rule laid down, even though the logic of the first branch of the
rule is not altogether convincing. But, assuming the correctness
" Guffey v. Smith, 237 U. S .101 (1915).
"I All the language of the courts cannot be reconciled, but, upon the whole, it seems
that the defendant is bound only to negative wilful injury to the known property of
another, and wilful disregard of another's rights. Lowell, J., in Trustees of Dart-
mouth College v. International Paper Co., supra, note 4.
"' 4 SUTHERLAND ON DAUAGEs, § 1020, p. 3789, and notes 73, 74, collecting the
cases.
2 Pittsburgh & West Virginia Gas Co. -v. Pentress Gas Co. supra, note 14.
See the statement of facts aupra,
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of the rule, it is with deference submitted that its application in
the Pentress Case was erroneous for the following reasons:
(1) There was no trespass, nor taking of the property of
another.
(2) The suit was for an accounting in equity, and not for
the recovery of specific property nor for damages.
(1) There was no trespass nor taking of the property of
another,21 since B was not the owner of the oil taken by C. The
courts of West Virginia have always held that the so-called oil
"lease" is not a conveyance of the oil, but only of "an exclusive
right to drill the land for the purpose of producing these minerals,
and to produce the same after they are discovered." The language
quoted is from the Pentress Case.2 2 The court further said: "Ad-
mittedly plaintiffs (B) had the exclusive right to drill -this land
for oil and gas, and the defendant (C) wrongfully took this right
from them. Plaintiffs likewise had the right, upon discovery
of the oil and gas, to produce and sell the same, and of this right
they were deprived by the defendants . . . " The court thus" re-
cognizing that B's right had been taken, fixed his damages as if
his oil had been taken. If B is deprived of the "right to produce
and sell" oil, as the court said, the problem clearly is to determine
the value of that right. In the Pentress Case the right was worth
nothing, since it reasonably cost five thousand dollars to test the
land, and fifteen hundred dollars to care for and transport the
fifteen hundred dollars worth of oil which was produced and sold.
B gained instead of losing, by C's wrongful act, since C, at his
own expense, tested the right and proved it worthless. The court
speaks of trespass, but there was, it is submitted, no trespass. B
had only a right, a species of property which may be of great value,
but which is not the subject of a trespass. If B had owned the oil,
trespass would have lain for the violation of his possession, or
trover for the wrongful conversion of it. But B did not own it.
Trespass on the case is the only action at law which would have
lain for C's violation of B's incorporeal right.23 The measure of
damages in such an action is, of course, the amount of the injury
See the statement of facts supra.
See also Lowther Oil Co. v. Miller Sibley Oil Co., 53 W. Va. B01, 44 S. E. 433(1903) ; Lawson v. Kirchner, 50 W. Va. 344, 40 S. E. 344 (1901) ; Steel Smith v.
Gartlan, 45 W. Va. 27, 29 S. E. 978 (1898) ; Crawford v. Rlehey, 43 W. Va. 252, 27
S. E. 220 (1897) ; State v. South Penn Oil Co.. 42 W. Va. 80, 24 S. E. 688 (1896);
Carper v. United Fuel Gas Co., 78 W. Va. 433, 89 S. D. 12 (1916); Musgrave v.
Musgrave, 86 W. Va. 119, at 135, 103 S. 3. 302 (1920).
Fleming v. Railroad, SI W. Va. 54, 41 S. E. 168 (1902) ; Union Petroleum Co. v.
Petroleum Co., 72 Pa. 173 (1872) ; Duffleld v. Rosenzwieg, 144 Pa. 520, at 537 ff., 23
Atl. 4 (1891). MLARTns, CIvm PROcEDURE, § 94; 1 CHnrTy, PLEADING, 139.
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resulting to the plaintiff from the defendant's wrongful act, or, if
no injury results, then nominal damages may be awarded.2 4 In
the case under discussion there was no injury, hence, it is sub-
mitted, there should have been no recovery of substantial damages.
(2) The action being one in equity for an accounting, even
though the oil taken by C had belonged to B the harsh measure
of recovery permitted in the case under discussion does not accord
with the rules usually applied by a court of equity. The court
had not, in previous cases of the same nature in which the wrong-
doer was at least as culpable as in this case, measured his wrong
with any such rule.25 In each of those cases a joint tenant had
produced and sold mineral from the premises in question and, in
a suit for an accounting in equity, was given credit for the amount
expended by him in such production. Those cases are distinguish-
ed by the court upon the ground that the relation of joint tenants
creates a relation "similar to that existing between a principal
and an agent who exceeds his authority," and that the claim made
by the wronged joint tenant amounted to a ratification of the en-
terprise, subjecting him to the burdens of it, as well as the benefits.
The suggestion carries a peril, since if a loss were sustained, the
joint tenant who had been wronged might find himself indebted
to the wrongdoer. But the court in the important case of William-
son v. Jones,2" definitely disclaimed any such position by saying
"It is therefore immaterial to define his exact case. Whether we
regard him as a tenant in common or a stranger, it is the same."
That case was expressly put upon the ground that he who seeks
equity must do equity, and that it is not equity to seek to have
the benefits of the enterprise of another while disclaiming the
burdens. An accounting in equity is for the purpose of requiring
the defendant to disgorge his unlawful gains, or to compensate
the plaintiff" for his actual losses. In the case under discussion
there were neither gains to the defendant, nor losses to the plaintiff.
To require the defendant to pay more than he has gained, and
more than the plaintiff has lost, is the imposition of a penalty
or forfeiture, which equity abhors. If a plaintiff seeks such an
award, he should not seek it at the hands of a court of conscience,
but as a strict legal right. In this connection it should be noted
24 Duffield -v. Rosenzwieg, Fleming v. Railroad, supra, note 23, and cases cited
therein.
5 Williamson -v. Jones, 43 W. Va. 562, 27 S. E. 411 (1897) ; McNeely v. South
Penn Oil Co., 58 W. Va. 438, 52 S. E. 480 (1905) ; South Penn Ol Co. v. Haught, 71W. Va. 720, 78 S. E. 759 (1913); Cecil v. Clark, 49 W. Va. 459, 39 S. E. 202(1901) ; Stewart v. Tennant, 52 W. Va. 559, 44 S. E. 223 (1903).
Supra, note 24, at page 568.
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that even though the plaintiff should proceed at law, nevertheless
if he desires to waive the tort and sue in asstimpsit as for money
had and received, the court of law will not permit him. to recover
more than the amount of the defendant's enrichment.2" The Pentress
Case therefore presents the anomalous situation of a court of
equity, under whose influence the courts of common law have
moulded the quasi-contractual remedies to prevent unjust enrich-
ment but not to penalize, adopting the harshest rule known to the
law courts, the admitted purpose of which is to inflict a penalty.
-J. W. M.
RECOUPMEENT-SET-0FF-AND COUNTERCLAIm.-At common law
there was no right of set-off, but at an early date recoupment was
invented and allowed to avoid circuity of action.1 It was allowed
in the assize of novel disseisin for rent which accrued during the
disseisin and in a few other instances when the reduction claimed
sprang immediately from the claim relied upon by the plaintiff,2
but was very limited.3 In modern law the term has a broader
signification. It is said to be "that right of the defendant in the
same action to claim damages from the plaintiff either because he
has not complied with some cross obligation of the contract upon
which he sues, or because he has violated some duty which the law
imposes upon him in the making or performance of that contract." 4
"A defense by way of recoupment denies the validity of the plain-
tiff's cause of action. It is not an independent cross claim like a
separate and distinct debt or item of account due from the plaintiff,
but is confined to matters arising out of or connected with the
contract or transaction which forms the basis of the plaintiff's
action. It goes only in abatement or reduction of the plaintiff's
claim and can be used as a substitute for a cross-action only to
the extent of the plaintiff's demand." 5  It is the right to set up
and prove damages as a defense because of failure on part of plain-
tiff to perform his contract.' In West Virginia the essentials of
" See Arthur L. Corbin, "Waiver of Tort and Suit in Assumpsit," 19 YAL L. J.221, 239.
Baltimore & Ohio R. Rt. Co. v. Jameson, 13 W. Va. 833 (1878) ; 4 MiNon's INST.,
2 ed,, 706.
2 Coulter's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 30a (1598) ; Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Jameson,
Supra.
' Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Jameson, supra.
' Dillon Beebe's Son v. Eakle, 43 W. Va. 502, 27 S. E. 214 (1897).Christiancy, J., in McHardy v. Wadsworth, 8 Mich. 349 (1860).
e Parker v. Hart, 32 N. J. Eq. 225 (1880) ; Michigan Yacht Club v. Busch, 143
Fed. 929, 936 (1906).
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